How to Fight Wars

April 28, 2008

It is frustrating that it seems we need to re-learn old lessons with every conflict we find ourselves engaged in, but at least it seems that we finally learn them. Here is a great example of how a Marine general has turned an Iraqi prison around with the real application of soft-power that is going to win a protracted war.

Few strategists would disagree, but most politicians and citizens are blissfully ignorant to the fact that the nature of war has completely changed. The purpose of the American Armed Forces isn’t so much tearing down as it is building and protecting–and this is a jarring difference from expectations. Were we a misguided Soviet army or vengeful fascists, we would have already accomplished our goals by flattening everything in sight. These are short-term and easy to affect with the modern tools of destruction.

However, whatever errant and deceitful path led us here, it is in the long-term interest of our nation (and the world, but whatever) to have a moderate, stable Iraq. This means, first above everything, that insurgents must be convinced that that they should put down their weapons, and a facility like Bucca works to accomplish this. Instead of torture, humiliation, and degradation–all practices that will lead to the hardening of resistance and the depletion of our morale–Bucca is making efforts to rehabilitate enemies and turn them, if not to friends, at least ambivalent towards violence. Allowing families to visit often is a fantastic move on General Stone’s part, reminding the combatants what they were fighting for in the first place, and showing them that there is a better way to ensure their safety.

I can hear the clamor of accusations already mobilizing against the prison’s policies of having

no maximum period for holding them. They are freed only when it has been determined by a review board they are no longer a security risk. Some have been locked up for more than three years.

Undoubtedly, I would like to see some kind of charge raised against every person imprisoned, superficial as they may be, so that inmates can be presented with a cause to their imprisonment, but in the meantime it seems to me that expediency can take precedence of bureaucracy.

Another note: the word “re-education” smacks of every depraved oppressor from the Nazis, to the Soviets, the North Vietnamese, and the Khmer Rouges, but before propaganda tries to connect these disparate dots, I’d like to see the military release a comprehensive overview of what, and how, re-education is being applied. I necessarily trust an moderate imam because other Muslim countries have employed a similar teaching style.

A lack of communication between political and military leaders and the citizens they serve has doomed missions in the past. Press coverage is good, but this is the kind of stuff that the President and the President-to-be needs to highlight and emphasize. This looks like an excellent counterinsurgency model that is finally being employed to a great effect. Hopefully this is a lesson we won’t need to learn again.

Of course, one hopes the military can find more eloquent speakers. Sometimes generals have a bit of a one track mind…

“Each detainee represents the possibility of being a moderate missile, if you will, fired into a community to spread a degree of moderacy and that’s the way we view it,” he says.

“If we have half of them hitting their target, it makes a huge difference.”

One Response to “How to Fight Wars”

  1. aristeides Says:

    I think that a great number of logistical and moral problems involved in post-WWII warfare is how limited warfare must be.

    That is not to say that limited warfare was not the norm for most of history – in fact, I think it was because there usually was not the vast mobilization of men into conscription and the rest of the population into war-time industry as seen during the two World Wars. But, the narrative of warfare is no longer driven by the capture of a city or destruction of the enemy’s supplies (though these are certain part of the story). The enemy is fundamentally different. He does not wear a uniform and he does not fight on a physical front that can be easily demarcated. There are no clearly “enemy” or “friendly” villages. Just because we have occupied a territory does not mean that it has been completely subjected to American ideals and manners. The enemy holds “pockets of resistance,” and so do we for that matter.

    This is especially acute in urban warfare in Iraq. I would say that the situation is quite different in Afghanistan, but that is another matter.

    We clearly see the results, from cliche images of Charlie in Viet Nam – unassuming farmer during the day, vicious VC during the night. We need a system of dealing with this kind of enemy that lies somewhere between My Lai and the bureaucratic headache of awarding every POW or suspected threat a bill of rights complete with competent lawyer and a litany of legal charges, all within the physical confines of an active war zone.

    I agree with you that there is some explaining that the military needs to do about the “re-education” program, and that the incarcerated persons need to be delivered charges. Perhaps even a third-party reviewer needs to check in on these prisons to ensure that physically abusive practices are not being used. But the military also has a duty to reduce casualties for its own personnel and subdue a country both militarily and psychologically, in terms of establishing a democratic mindset in Iraq.

    The invasion phase of the Iraq War is over and it has given way to the police action phase. But the military is still the military and it is still executing military missions in Iraq. I think that this prison is a good balance of military and police function.

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