A New Army for Every War

Strictly speaking, no two moments are ever alike.  Even on an infinitesimal scale, the measure of time spent between breaths contains entire univereses of possibility, no two exactly similar.  Now blow this up to the grand scale of politics and it doesn’t take a professional philosopher (ha!) to figure out that no two situations will exactly repeat themselves.

It’s important to take lessons from the past, recognize patterns where they exist (and acknowledge where they don’t), and make educated plans for the future.  It is reckless, and a mistake oft repeated, to seize on a model and apply it wholesale to new conditions.  This is best illustrated in the arena of armed conflict.

The Atlantic points out how the apparent success, and political popularity, of the Petraeus Doctrine is reshaping the future of the army. The Petraeus Doctrine was overdue for Iraq, there is no denying that.  If civilian leaders had done any research on Iraq, or any history at all, they would have recognized the need for a counterinsurgency plan and an occupational strategy.  As it was, the army was forced to reinvent itself on the fly, and what a testament it is to the soldiers and officers that they were able to do this.  That being said, it’s in danger of going too far.

Undoubtedly, the Patraeus Doctrine will help the army avoid a similar shock in the future.  But the article points out the dangers of seeing the Doctrine as an end in itself for armed forces.  It’s most vocal opponent deserves to be listened to, fearing:

that an infatuation with stability operations will lead the Army to reinvent itself as “a constabulary,” adept perhaps at nation-building but shorn of adequate capacity for conventional war-fighting.

While it is important that the army be ready to take on all situations, and all aspects of war, it should not put slack on the most basic abilities in order to refocus the battle to hearts and minds.  It needs to be remembered that before the stage of “winning hearts and minds,” one needs to conquerer hearts and minds, armed with weapons, and shooting them at our soldiers.

I take issues with Gentile’s assertion that Abrams’ strategy wouldn’t work in Vietnam.  I think the evidence currently supports the claim that, with continued funding (and no American soldiers) victory was possible.  That being said, I understand his defense of this position.  Strategy is not always strictly about “victory,” it’s also about cutting losses.  If the army is being geared to fight long wars, it will fight long wars, even when they are best avoided altogether.

Ultimately, the goal of the army must be the protection of Americans, and that includes the soldiers who serve it.  Rigid plans to fight past wars will not accomplish this.  The army should absorb the Patraeus Doctrine like a sponge and let it soak alongside the Powell Doctrine before it decides to wring it all out. The army needs to be flexible and ready to adapt, not stiff and forced to adapt.

Better yet, their civilian bosses should remember the Washington Farewell Doctrine.